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The Antitrust Implications of Connell Construction




The federal antitrust laws reflect and promote national policy in
favor of competition. The federal labor laws foster large-scale orga-
nizational activities by labor unions. Quite frequently, union activ-
ity has the capacity and effect of interfering with the economic and
non-economic objectives of the antitrust laws. As a result, the
courts have long struggled to resolve the clash between the pro-
competitive purposes of the antitrust laws and the anti-competi-
tive impact of union activity fostered by the labor laws. In Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,1 the Su-
preme Court once again attempted to accomodate the goals of the
national antitrust and labor laws.
In the consideration of the Connell decision and its meaning, at-
tention should be given to the issues raised, resolved, or left open
by the Supreme Court's resolution of the dispute therein. First:
Are conduct and agreements which are permitted by the labor laws
thereby exempted from scrutiny under the antitrust laws? Second:
Are conduct or agreements which are prohibited by the labor laws
and remedied by the labor laws also subject to sanctions under the
antitrust laws? Third: Is Connell a "sport" case limited solely to
the construction industry and cases which involve section 8(e) of
the National Labor Relations Act? Fourth: Is Connell limited to
only non-collective bargaining contexts or does it have significance
for antitrust suits brought within collective bargaining contexts?
Fifth: What is Connell's practical significance to a lawyer whose
client is being damaged by unlawful union conduct, but who has no
effective remedy under the labor laws?
To fully understand Connell, it is necessary to view the case in
* Partner, Clark, West, Keller, Butler & Ellis, Dallas, Texas.
** Associate, Fox and Grove, Chicago, Illinois.
1. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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its historical perspective. Connell marked another chapter in the
ongoing struggle between trade unions and general contractors in
the construction industry in Dallas. In an earlier chapter, a trade
union council sought an agreement with a construction employers'
association. That agreement would have restricted subcontracting
to employers which had signed agreements with appropriate local
craft unions. The trades council was not the authorized bargaining
agent of any of the contractors' employees; moreover, the trades
council disavowed any intention to become a bargaining represen-
tative. When the employers' association, which bargained for the
contractors, refused to sign the restrictive subcontracting agree-
ment, the trades council served the subcontracting agreement on
four specific contractors. Those four also refused to sign the agree-
ment, and the trades council subsequently picketed many of their
jobsites.
The picketed contractors filed unfair labor practice charges with
the NLRB. The NLRB subsequently found that the trades council
had violated section 8(b)(7) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) by picketing with a recognitional objective at a time when
no question concerning representation could be raised because of
contract-bar rules. The Board issued a cease and desist order
against the union, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit enforced the Board's order. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
union's argument that the subcontracting agreement was protected
by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e), which prohib-
its hot cargo agreements, and that Congress could not have in-
tended to limit picketing to achieve such agreements. The Court
held that sections 8(b)(7) and 8(e) of the NLRA are aimed at whol-
ly different problems. The Court then held that even though an
agreement is lawful under section 8(e), and that picketing to secure
the agreement is not prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(A), the picket-
ing may be prohibited by section 8(b)(7) if it has an object that is
recognitional.3
Connell arose in the aftermath of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's decision. In Connell, Plumbers Local 100 began picketing
Dallas general contractors in order to pressure them to sign restric-
tive agreements limiting their subcontracts for plumbing and
mechanical work to firms that had a collective bargaining agree-
2. Dallas Bldg. and Const. Trades Council v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
3. Id. at 682.
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ment with Local 100. The general contractors performed none of
their plumbing and mechanical work, and Local 100 admittedly
had no interest in representing their employees. Consequently, the
union was beyond the reach of the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision and section 8(b)(7). While the decision in Connell does
not disclose such fact, the local International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers (IBEW) union likewise had demanded and picketed
to obtain the same restrictive subcontracting agreement from a
number of general contractors who did not self-perform any elec-
trical work.
In the Connell context, Local 100 also had sent a restrictive sub-
contracting agreement to the K.A.S. Construction Company lo-
cated near Dallas, Texas, and then picketed the company. K.A.S.
refused to sign; instead, it filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB. The NLRB's Regional Director refused to issue a com-
plaint against the union; the Board's General Counsel thereafter
denied the company's appeal, thus denying the company any hope
of administrative relief under the pertinent federal labor law.4
Connell, like K.A.S., also was asked to sign an agreement requir-
ing it to subcontract all plumbing and mechanical work to firms
having collective bargaining agreements with Local 100. Local 100
had never sought to represent or act as the collective bargaining
representative for Connell's employees. In fact, Local 100 had dis-
claimed any interest in representing Connell's employees. Local
100 was party to a multi-employer bargaining agreement with the
Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas. The multi-employer
agreement contained a "most favored nation clause" which gave
Association members the contractual right to insist on terms as
favorable as those given by Local 100 to any other employer.
When Connell refused to sign the subcontracting agreement, Lo-
cal 100 picketed one of Connell's jobsites and halted construction
there. Since Connell was aware that it had no reasonable hope for
relief from the NLRB, it filed suit in state district court to enjoin
the picketing as a violation of the Texas antitrust laws. Local 100
then removed the case to the federal district court. Connell subse-
quently signed -the subcontracting agreement under protest. After
removal, Connell amended its complaint to allege that the agree-
ment violated sections 1 and 2 of the Act. Connell sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief against the union.
4. 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3012, 3013-14 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1973), rev'd in part, afj'd in part, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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The federal district court held that the subcontracting agree-
ment was exempt from federal antitrust laws because it was immu-
nized by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). The
court also held that federal labor legislation preempted the state's
antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
without reaching the section 8(e) issue, on the ground that the
union's goal of organizing nonunion subcontractors involved a le-
gitimate union interest, and therefore the union's efforts to attain
that goal were exempt from the federal antitrust laws. The court of
appeals also agreed that state law was preempted. 5
In a five-to-four majority opinion by Justice Powell, the Su-
preme Court reversed on the question of federal antitrust immu-
nity, and affirmed on the question of state law preemption. The
Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of the claim
that the agreement violated the Sherman Act.'
The Court's majority opinion acknowledged that a labor union
may avail itself of either of two types of exemptions from the oper-
ation of the antitrust laws. One type - a statutory exemption - is
provided by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Hutcheson.7 Under the statutory exemption, specific union activi-
ties, including secondary picketing and boycotts, concededly were
removed from the operation of the antitrust laws. Another type of
exemption - the nonstatutory exemption - which was applied by
the Supreme Court in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co.8 "has its source in the strong labor policy favoring
the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages
and working conditions." Justice Powell noted, however, that the
statutory exemption does not apply to concerted action or agree-
ments between unions and non-labor parties. He also stated that
"while the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some
restraints by acting unilaterally . . . the nonstatutory exemption
offers no similar protection when a union and a nonlabor party
agree to restrain competition in a business market. '"1
Justice Powell focused on the goal of Local 100 and found no
evidence that the goal was anything but organizational. He ac-
5. 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
6. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
7. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
8. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
9. 421 U.S. at 622.
10. Id. at 622-23.
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knowledged that this "goal was legal, even though a successful or-
ganizing campaign ultimately would reduce the competition that
unionized employers face from non-union firms.""1 Moreover, there
was no evidence of a conspiracy between the union and the mem-
bers of the multi-employer bargaining unit.12 Nonetheless, the
Court's majority concluded that the restrictive subcontracting
agreements were not immune from antitrust scrutiny since "the
methods the union chose are not immune from antitrust sanctions
simply because the goal is legal.' "
In the view of the Court's majority, Local 100 had used direct
restraints on the commercial market to achieve its clearly lawful
organization objective. The majority concluded that the restrictive
agreements with Connell and other general contractors "indiscrim-
inately excluded non-union subcontractors from a portion of the
market, even if their competitive advantages were not derived from
substandard wages and working conditions but rather from more
efficient operating methods." 4
Justice Powell examined the multi-employer contract between
Local 100 and the Mechanical Contractors Association to deter-
mine the effect on the business market of the union's agreement
with Connell. This analysis is significant because the multi-em-
ployer contract had not been challenged in the lawsuit. Justice
Powell also focused on the most favored nation clause contained in
the multi-employer contract, and inferred that it would shelter As-
sociation contractors from competition in that portion of the mar-
ket covered by Local 100's subcontracting agreements with general
contractors. The shelter would apply to all subjects included in the
multi-employer contract, "even on subjects unrelated to wages,
hours, and working conditions.'
5
Justice Powell next speculated that the Local 100's subcontract-
ing agreement with Connell and other general contractors would
give the union control over access to the mechanical subcontract-
ing market. The subcontracting agreements restricted subcontract-
ing to any firm that did not have a contract with Local 100, not
just to non-union firms in general. In Justice Powell's opinion, this
gave Local 100 "complete control over subcontract work offered
11. Id. at 625.
12. Id. at n.2.
13. Id. at 625.
14. Id. at 623.
15. Id. at 624.
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by' 6 Connell and other general contractors which had signed the
subcontracting agreements. Moreover, "such control" could result
"in significant adverse effects on the market and on consumers -
effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing work-
ers and standardizing working conditions. ' 17 For example, the
union might refuse to sign contracts with "marginal" or non-re-
sident firms. 18 Thus, according to the majority's understanding of
the record:
Here Local 100, by agreement with several contractors, made nonunion sub-
contractors ineligible to compete for a portion of the available work. This
kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompeti-
tive effects, both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from
the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions. It con-
travenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor
policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the anti-
trust laws.1'
Justice Powell intimated that since there was no collective bar-
gaining relationship whatsoever between Local 100 and Connell,
the subcontracting agreement was not protected from antitrust
scrutiny by the federal policy favoring collective bargaining. Citing
the Court's Pennington and Jewel Tea decisions as authority, Jus-
tice Powell stated: "There can be no argument in this case,
whatever its force in other contexts, that a restraint of this magni-
tude might be entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were in-
cluded in a lawful collective-bargaining agreement."20 By implica-
tion, Justice Powell suggested that henceforth the validity of
market restraints should turn on whether they result from a collec-
tively bargained agreement or whether the anti-competitive effect
arises from a separate, non-collectively bargained agreement.
Justice Powell then rejected the union's claim that the subcon-
tracting agreement was permitted by the construction industry
proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA. He referred to the legislative
history, and noted that one of the major aims of the 1959 amend-
ments to the NLRA - including section 8(e) - was to limit "top
down" organizing campaigns. He noted changes made by Congress
in 1959 to limit the ability of a union to utilize such pressure to
obtain recognition. It was also clear to him that this attempt to
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 624-25.
19. Id. at 625.
20. Id. at 625-26.
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limit "top down" organizing would be seriously undermined if the
proviso to section 8(e) was construed to authorize the subcontract-
ing agreements sought by Local 100. For, if the agreements were in
fact protected by the proviso, the union would have an unlimited
ability to pressure contractors to deal only with subcontractors
who were signatories to agreements with the union, as long as that
contractor employed no workers within the union's jurisdiction.
Justice Powell concluded, therefore, that "[a]bsent a clear indi-
cation that Congress intended to leave such a glaring loophole in
its restrictions on 'top down' organizing," the construction industry
proviso should not be construed to authorize the subcontracting
agreement in Connell.21 Instead, he concluded that the protection
of the proviso to section 8(e) "extends only to agreements in the
context of collective-bargaining relationships and, in light of con-
gressional references to the Denver Building Trades problem, pos-
sibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as
well. '"2 2 Since Local 100 had no interest in representing Connell's
employees, the subcontracting agreements were held not to be
within the protection of the proviso to section 8(e).
Finally, Justice Powell rejected the union's alternative conten-
tion that, in any event, the NLRA provides the exclusive remedies
for violations of section 8(e), stating:
[W]hatever significance this legislative choice has for antitrust suits based
on those secondary activities prohibited by § 8(b)(4), it has no relevance to
the question whether Congress meant to preclude antitrust suits based on
the "hot cargo" agreements that it outlawed in 1959. There is no legislative
history in the 1959 Congress suggesting that labor-law remedies for § 8(e)
violations were intended to be exclusive, or that Congress thought allowing
antitrust remedies in cases like the present one would be inconsistent with
the remedial scheme of the NLRA.' 3
The Supreme Court majority, however, did not hold that the sub-
contracting agreement in Connell actually violated the Sherman
Act. Instead, that question was left for resolution on remand. The
case subsequently was settled, however, thereby mooting the entire
issue.
Connell was developed and tried on an antitrust theory because
the NLRB had refused to issue unfair labor practice complaints on
charges based on the same restrictive subcontracting agreement
and similar picketing activity. Thus Connell ended as an antitrust
21. Id. at 633.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 634.
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case with potentially far-reaching implications for labor-manage-
ment relations. However, those implications are not very clear.
For instance, was Connell limited to the construction industry
and, specifically, to situations there which involve so-called "hot
cargo" agreements prohibited by section 8(e)? If so, did Connell
have applicability to secondary behavior once thought to fall
within the exclusive domain of the labor laws? Or did Connell also
have implications outside the construction industry? Was Connell
limited to non-collective bargaining contexts or did Connell also
have meaning in some agreements made in collective bargaining
contexts?
Recently the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB,24 and two other consoli-
dated cases. The Court therein resolved a critical issue left unan-
swered in Connell. The issue concerned the extent of protection
afforded by section 8(e)'s construction industry proviso to agree-
ments sought or obtained within the context of a collective bar-
gaining relationship. In Connell, the Court had held that a subcon-
tracting agreement "which is outside the context of a collective-
bargaining relationship and not restricted to a particular jobsite
• . . may be the basis of a federal antitrust suit . . "2. As a
result of this somewhat expansive language, it was unclear whether
the construction industry proviso sheltered broad collectively bar-
gained subcontracting agreements which were not limited to par-
ticular jobsites or to specific unions.
In Woelke & Romero, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
the section 8(e) proviso "ordinarily shelters union signatory sub-
contracting clauses that are sought or negotiated in the context of
a collective bargaining relationship, even when not limited in ap-
plication to particular jobsites at which both union and non-union
workers are employed. '2 The Court further held, on procedural
grounds, that the courts lack jurisdiction to consider whether sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(A) is violated when a union pickets to obtain a pro-
tected subcontracting clause, if the issue was not properly raised
during the proceedings before the NLRB.
The Woelke & Romero cases contrast markedly with the Connell
case. They were instituted solely as labor cases - they were liti-
gated solely as labor cases - and they were decided solely as labor
24. 102 S. Ct. 2071 (1982).
25. 421 U.S. at 635.
26. 102 S. Ct. at 2083.
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cases. This is to be explained by the fact that the NLRB's General
Counsel issued complaints in the Woelke & Romero cases, whereas
at the time of Connell, he was disinclined to do so, which made it
necessary for Connell to seek judicial relief on alternate legal theo-
ries. Finally, the foremost distinction between the Woelke & Ro-
mero cases and Connell case is that, unlike the agreement in Con-
nell, the agreements in Woelke & Romero arose within the context
of a collective bargaining relationship.
Woelke & Romero and its companion cases resulted from two
separate labor disputes. In Woelke & Romero, a framing contractor
had a collective bargaining relationship with the Carpenters Union.
During negotiations, the union demanded inclusion of a clause that
would prohibit Woelke from subcontracting work at any jobsite
"except to a person, firm or corporation, party to an appropriate,
current labor agreement with the appropriate Union, or
subordinate body signatory to this agreement. 2 7 The parties
reached an impasse over the union's demand for the union signa-
tory subcontracting clause. In support of the union's demand, two
union locals picketed Woelke's construction sites, resulting in some
work stoppages.
Woelke filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, as-
serting that the subcontracting clauses violated section 8(e).
Woelke also argued that because the clauses violated section 8(e),
the picketing to obtain them violated section 8(b)(4)(A). The
Board held that the union signatory subcontracting clauses were
secondary in nature; however, the Board further held that the
clauses were protected by the construction industry proviso. Al-
though the clauses were not limited in their application to particu-
lar jobsites where both union and non-union workers were em-
ployed, the Board concluded that they were lawful under Connell
since they were sought or negotiated "in the context of collective
bargaining relationships.
'2 8
The remaining two cases involved the Pacific Northwest Chapter
of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., and the Oregon-
Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of
America, Inc. For almost two decades, the Oregon AGC was party
to a collective bargaining agreement with the Operating Engineers
Union. The agreement contained a subcontracting clause which
27. Id. at 2074.
28. 239 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 241, 250 (1978), rev'd, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), en-
forced on reh'g, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), affd in part, vacated in part, 102
S. Ct. 2071 (1982).
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was substantially similar to the one in the agreement to which
Woelke and the Carpenters were parties. Specifically, the agree-
ment forbade the Oregon AGC from subcontracting construction
jobsite work to "any person, firm or company who does not have
an existing labor agreement with the [Engineers] Union covering
such work." The agreement also authorized the engineers to take
"such action as they deem necessary," including strikes and other
economic self-help, to enforce awards obtained through the griev-
ance and arbitration process on matters covered by the agreement.
Like Woelke, the Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated
Builders & Contractors filed unfair labor practice charges with the
NLRB, alleging that the contract violated section 8(e). The Board,
relying on the same reasoning it used in Woelke & Romero, held
that the union signatory subcontracting clauses, standing alone,
were protected by the construction industry proviso. However, the
Board decided that the enforcement provision of the contract was
not protected by the proviso.2 9
A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
cases, as consolidated, and reversed the Board's decisions. Subse-
quently, the cases were reheard en banc, and the en banc Court
panel enforced the Board's orders in their entirety.30 The Supreme
Court thereafter affirmed the en banc Ninth Circuit on the issue of
the scope of the construction industry proviso, but vacated and re-
manded with instructions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds that
portion of the court of appeal's judgment pertaining to the section
8(b)(4)(A) issue.
Justice Marshall, speaking for the unanimous Court, reviewed
the language of section 8(e) and the wording of the subcontracting
clauses, and concluded that the clauses were saved by the con-
struction industry proviso. In Connell, the Court had reasoned
that the proviso did not protect the agreements because they were
not sought or obtained in a collective-bargaining relationship. In
Woelke & Romero, based on the legislative history, Justice Mar-
shall concluded that:
Congress believed that broad subcontracting clauses similar to those at issue
here were part of the pattern of collective-bargaining prior to 1959, and that
the Board and the Courts had found them to be lawful. This perception was
29. 239 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 274, 277 (1978), rev'd, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), en-
forced on reh'g, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), afi'd in part, vacated in part, 102
S. Ct. 2071 (1982).




apparently accurate. Thus, endorsing the clauses at issue here is fully con-
sistent with the legislative history of § 8(e) and the construction industry
proviso."
Justice Marshall refused to interpret the proviso as protecting
only those clauses designed to prevent jobsite friction. He stated
that "the proviso serves a variety of purposes unrelated to the
Denver Building Trades problem [and] even as a response to Den-
ver Building Trades, the proviso is only partly concerned with job-
site friction.
32
Justice Marshall conceded that the subcontracting agreements in
Woelke & Romero facilitated top-down organizing. He also con-
ceded that "one of the central aims of the 1959 [Landrum-Griffin]
amendments was to restrict the ability of unions to engage in top-
down organizing campaigns."" In his view, however, Congress was
aware that some top-down organizing was inevitable - even if
agreements were limited to jobsites having both union and non-
union workers. Therefore, the Court's broad construction of the
proviso would not lead to results which were unforseen by Con-
gress when it adopted the proviso:
Such pressure is implicit in the construction industry proviso. The bare as-
sertion that a particular subcontracting agreement encourages top-down or-
ganizing pressure does not resolve the issue we confront in this case: how
much top-down pressure did Congress intend to tolerate when it decided to
exempt construction site projects from § 8(e)? As we have already ex-
plained, we believe that Congress endorsed subcontracting agreements ob-
tained in the context of a collective-bargaining relationship - and decided
to accept whatever top-down pressure such clauses might entail. Congress
concluded that the community of interests on the construction jobsite justi-
fied the top-down organizational consequences that might attend the pro-
tection of legitimate collective-bargaining objectives.3
A recent decision from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
lends support to the conclusion that since the agreements in
Woelke & Romero were lawful under the NLRA, they therefore
would be entitled to antitrust exemption. In Jou-Jou Designs, Inc.
v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union,35 the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a federal court complaint alleging
Sherman Act violations by the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union and another union.
31. 102 S. Ct. at 2080.
32. Id. at 2081.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2081-82.
35. 643 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1981), afl'g, 490 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Jou-Jou involved attempts by unions in the New York garment
industry to obtain so-called "Hazantown Agreements." Generally
speaking, Hazantown Agreements are the garment industry
equivalent of restrictive subcontracting agreements in the con-
struction industry. Among other things, they require signatory
companies to use only outside contractors having collective bar-
gaining agreements with one or more specified union locals. Ha-
zantown Agreements are clearly secondary in nature; however, they
are permitted by the garment industry proviso to section 8(e) of
the NLRA. In Jou-Jou, the Second Circuit was asked to consider
whether union attempts - including picketing - to secure such
agreements from a sportswear jobber and three affiliated corpora-
tions were protected from the antitrust attack by the statutory ex-
emptions to the antitrust laws. The court of appeals concluded
that the Hazantown Agreements were exempt from antitrust sanc-
tions because they were "affirmatively sanctioned by labor law"
specifically, by the garment industry proviso to section 8(e).
In a case involving the scope of the construction industry pro-
viso, the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York reached the same conclusion as the Second Circuit in In
re Bullard Contracting Corp. 6
Many questions remain unanswered. For example, when does a
union lose its antitrust immunity in the Connell context? When
does liability attach to the union? Assume the absence of a collec-
tive bargaining relationship; and further assume that the existence
of some kind of agreement as in Connell - or union attempts to
secure such an agreement - are found to violate the NLRA. Does
such finding mean that the union has automatically lost its non-
statutory antitrust immunity? In Connell, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that this might be, or probably is, the result. Very recently,
in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins,87 the Supreme Court made spe-
cific reference to its Connell decision and reinforced this conclu-
sion. The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits also seem to have
reached this conclusion. 8
36. 464 F. Supp. 312, 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
37. 102 S. Ct. 851 (1982).
38. Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 641 F.2d 90, 94 (3rd Cir.
1981); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 579
F.2d 484, 503 (9th Cir.& 1978) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting); cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1089 (1979). Accord, International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators and Asbestos




However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that loss of the
labor exemption is not tantamount to a finding of antitrust liabil-
ity. In Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime Associa-
tion,39 the Court stated:
It is plain from our cases that an antitrust case need not be tried and a
violation found before a determination can be made that a collective-bar-
gaining agreement is not within the labor exemption, just as it is clear that
denying the exemption does not mean there is an antitrust violation.'0
The Supreme Court specifically referred to its Connell decision as
an example of just such a case. Thus, it is evident that once an
agreement is placed beyond the protection of the exemption, it re-
mains to be proved that a violation has occurred. 1
The question remains, however, as to what mode of analysis is
proper for ascertaining the legality or illegality of Connell-type
agreements under the antitrust laws. Should such agreements be
assessed under traditional antitrust principles - that is, under the
rule of reason test or the per se test? Or should other tests be
adopted in view of the labor relations - not purely commercial -
contexts giving rise to such agreements?
In Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Building
and Construction Trades Council,'42 the Third Circuit reaffirmed
its prior holding in Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Ship-
ping Association4 and held that when union activity is attacked
on antitrust grounds, the court first must determine whether the
activity is protected by the labor exemption to the antitrust laws.
The Third Circuit stated that once it is ascertained that union ac-
tivity is not protected by the labor exemption "a court must apply
traditional antitrust principles in determining whether the activity
in question violates the antitrust laws. In most cases the rule of
reason will supply the measure of illegality; the per se rule may,
however, be invoked where appropriate."
'44
In Muko, two building trades council unions pressured a fast-
food restaurant chain into agreeing to retain only unionized gen-
eral contractors to build its restaurant outlets. The company previ-
39. 435 U.S. 40 (1978).
40. Id. at 61.
41. Accord, Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Coun-
cil, 670 F.2d 421, 426 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 229-30 (1982); Smitty Baker Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers, 620 F.2d 416, 426 (4th Cir. 1980).
42. 670 F.2d 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 229-30 (1982).
43. 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 448 U.S. 902 (1980).
44. 670 F.2d at 427-28.
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ously had a policy of soliciting bids from contractors on a competi-
tive basis regardless of whether the contractors used union labor,
and most of the company's work had been performed by non-union
contractors.
The company awarded Muko a contract to build an outlet in a
Pittsburgh suburb. Muko was a non-union general contractor with
experience in construction of fast-food restaurants. During con-
struction the jobsite was picketed by members of the Southwestern
Pennsylvania Building and Construction Trades Council and the
Building and Construction Trades Council of Pittsburgh. The
Councils had never represented Muko's employees and had no in-
terest in doing so. After construction of the first outlet was com-
pleted, the company awarded Muko a contract to construct an-
other outlet.
After the company's first outlet had opened, the Councils dis-
tributed handbills urging customers not to patronize the restaurant
because it purportedly used contractors who paid less than the
prevailing area wages. After reading the handbills, customers
would leave the premises.
The company and the Councils subsequently met. At the meet-
ing, the Councils said they wanted future restaurants built by
union labor. The company was given a form contract which was
used by the Councils' local unions and union contractors in the
area. In addition, the company was given a list of contractors hav-
ing collective bargaining agreements with the local unions.
Bowing to the unions' pressure, the company subsequently sent
the unions a letter of intent stating that it would "use only union
contractors certified by the [Councils]."" The company asked
Muko to build as a union contractor. He refused to do so, and sub-
sequently was not asked to bid on any further jobs, although the
company had previously expressed satisfaction with his work and
had told him he could construct all of the company's restaurants in
western Pennsylvania if he continued to offer high quality work at
competitive prices. The company thereafter only used union con-
tractors to build some twelve of its restaurants. As a result, the
company's costs ran a quarter million dollars higher than the costs
would have been if Muko had been retained.
Muko filed a lawsuit against the company and the two Councils.
The lawsuit alleged that the company and the Councils had en-
tered into an agreement constituting an unreasonable restraint of
45. Id. at 423.
392 Vol. 21:379
Beyond Collective Bargaining
trade in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. At the first
trial, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the de-
fendants. On appeal, the Third Circuit - sitting en banc - re-
versed and remanded the case for a new trial.
The Third Circuit held that a jury could have found that there
was an agreement which was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny
because, under the Connell decision, such an agreement might
have "actual or potential anti-competitive effects that would not
flow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and
working conditions." '" The court said that it understood:
Connell to hold, then, that an agreement between a union and a business
organization, outside a collective bargaining relationship, which imposes a
direct restraint upon a business market, and which is not justified by con-
gressional labor policy because it has actual or potential anticompetitive ef-
fects that would not flow naturally from the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions, is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
47
While the Third Circuit did not define the proper standard for
measuring any potential antitrust violations, it suggested that
traditional antitrust principles would govern such a deter-
mination.4 s
At the second trial the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the
defendants. The trial court denied Muko's motion for a new trial
and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Muko ap-
pealed on two grounds: First, because the trial court purportedly
committed legal error by instructing the jury to apply the rule of
reason, rather than the per se rule, to the agreement between the
restaurant company and the unions; and Second, because even if
the trial court was correct in applying the rule of reason, the court
purportedly erred in its instructions on the relevant product
market.
On appeal, the Third Circuit Panel (Adams, Van Dusen, and
Sloviter, JJ.) affirmed the trial court. The panel majority (Judge
Sloviter dissented) unanimously agreed that the trial court gave
correct instructions regarding the product market. However, the
panel majority split over the applicable standard for measuring the
potential antitrust liability of the agreement in issue. The panel
majority expressly rejected the view that there should be a full-
scale rule of reason inquiry in each case where it is claimed that a
46. 609 F.2d 1368, 1373 (3d Cir. 1979).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1376.
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non-exempt activity violates the antitrust laws.49 This view - as
the opinion acknowledged - has gained scholarly support, includ-
ing support from Professor Milton Handler. On the other hand,
the panel majority also rejected Muko's view that every labor-anti-
trust case in which the labor exemption is found to be inapplicable
should be held illegal under the per se standard. Instead, the ma-
jority took a middle position, stating:
[W]e adopt a middle position between that advocated by Professor Handler
and that proposed by the appellant in the case at hand. While we agree with
Professor Handler that the 'factors to be considered in determining the ex-
istence of an antitrust exemption are separate and distinct from those bear-
ing on the presence of an antitrust infraction,' and that 'once such conduct
is deemed not exempt, it is incumbent upon the decisionmaker to consider
the relative anticompetitiveness of the conduct before imposing antitrust
liability,'. . . we do not share Professor Handler's view that union conduct
necessarily 'should be measured by the rule of reason in recognition of the
peculiar labor relations context in which the restraint arises even if, in a
nonlabor context, similar conduct might be per se unlawful.' The mere fact
that a labor union is one of the participants in an otherwise illegal combina-
tion should not preclude a determination that, in appropriate circum-
stances, the conduct is unreasonable per se. The per se rule is, essentially, a
short cut employed by a court in determining unreasonableness; as Profes-
sor Sullivan has taught, 'the per se doctrine is precisely a special case of
rule of reason analysis.' If, after extensive experience with a particular kind
of union conduct, a court concludes that the conduct invariably restrains
competition, it is unnecessary, in our view, for the court to engage in
lengthy rule-of-reason analysis when the per se rule would yield identical
results more efficiently and expeditiously. 50
In Muko, the panel majority understandably cautioned against
the "mechanical or imprudent application of the per se rule in the
labor context." 1 As previously mentioned, loss of antitrust exemp-
tion is not tantamount to a finding of an antitrust violation. This
was indicated by the Supreme court in Connell and acknowledged
by the court in Muko. Moreover, in Muko, in a footnote, the court
appeared to reject any argument that conduct which violates the
NLRA was therefore violative of the antitrust laws, stating:
We are ... unpersuaded by Muko's recitation of the legislative history of
§ 8(e) of the NLRA, (the so called 'hot cargo' provision) which indicates
Congress' intent to make hot cargo agreements illegal per se under the labor
laws. Even assuming that the defendants' conduct would be deemed illegal
under § 8(e), we see no reason to presume that Congress intended the same
49. 670 F.2d at 426.




conduct to be ipso facto violative of the antitrust laws, which were enacted
at a different time, for a different purpose and which provide for sharply
different relief ... .
The court acknowledged that group boycotts have traditionally
been condemned as conduct which is unreasonable per se. Conced-
edly, the term group boycott encompasses several possible forms of
behavior, and not every type has been or should be found unrea-
sonable or unreasonable per se. Accordingly, the Third Circuit, in
limiting the application of the per se rule speaks of the "classic"
boycott." The court referred to one of its prior decisions, and
stated that a concerted activity constitutes a per se illegal group
boycott only when "there [is] a purpose either to exclude a person
or group from the market, or to accomplish some other anticompe-
titive objective or both.""
In a labor context, the Third Circuit delineated three so-called
''core-group" situations in which group boycotts have been deemed
illegal per se: "(1) horizontal combinations of traders at one level
of distribution having the purpose of excluding direct competitors
from the market; (2) vertical combinations, designed to exclude
from the market direct competitors of some members of the com-
binations; and (3) coercive combinations aimed at influencing the
trade practices of boycott victims."55
When these principles were applied by the panel majority to
Muko's facts, it was concluded that Muko did not involve a classic
group boycott against which the per se rule traditionally has been
invoked, because: first, one competitor did not engage in concerted
action with a supplier or customer to cut another horizontal com-
petitor out of the marketplace. Second, there was no suggestion of
attempted price-fixing. Third, neither the restaurant company nor
the Councils competed with each other or with Muko; (a) there
was no evidence that the restaurant company intended to affect
Muko's business: it only sought to maintain the goodwill of its cus-
tomers in a new market; (b) the Council only sought to ensure pay-
ment of the prevailing union wages to Pittsburgh-area construction
workers. Fourth, none of the evidence suggested that either the
restaurant or the Councils wished, through concerted action, to
gain an advantage over Muko in an economic or competitive sense.
Fifth, the restraint involved was limited, not widespread. The re-
52. Id. at 427 n.5 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 430.
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 431 (citations omitted).
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fusal to deal involved only one relatively small buyer. Moreover, it
did not have the necessary anti-competitive effect of destroying
Muko's business. Sixth, pro-competitive effects were demon-
strated, since the restaurant company gained a position in the oth-
erwise crowded Pittsburgh area fast food market."'
The status of group boycotts under the antitrust laws still is
somewhat unclear. In Connell, Justice Powell stated that the Clay-
ton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts "exempt specific union activities,
including secondary picketing and boycotts, from the operation of
the law."'6 7 In support, he cited United States v. Hutcheson, which
involved a consumer boycott. There Justice Frankfurter, announc-
ing the Court's opinion, stated:
[S]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished
by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particu-
lar union activities are the means. 8
When Hutcheson, Connell, and Muko are read together, it is evi-
dent that group boycotts are not immunized from antitrust scru-
tiny. This does not mean, however, that such boycotts will be
deemed to have violated the antitrust laws, even where they violate
the NLRA. Recent First Circuit and Supreme Court decisions sup-
port this conclusion.
In International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied Interna-
tional, Inc.,59 the First Circuit held, inter alia, that a union's politi-
cal boycott was "in commerce" within the meaning of the NLRA,
and that despite its political purpose, the boycott constituted an
illegal secondary boycott prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
NLRA. The case arose when the union responded to Russia's inva-
sion of Afghanistan by ordering its members to stop handling car-
goes arriving from or destined for Russia. The union's members
obeyed, and refused to service ships carrying Russian cargoes. Al-
lied, an American importer of Russian wood products, responded
to the boycott by filing a suit in the federal district court in
Boston.
Allied sought judicial relief for violations of both the labor laws
and the antitrust laws. Specifically, Allied alleged, among other
56. Id. at 432-33.
57. 421 U.S. at 622.
58. 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
59. 640 F.2d 1368, aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982).
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things, that the union's activities violated section 8(b)(4)'s prohibi-
tion against secondary boycotts and, therefore, that Allied was en-
titled to damages under section 303 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act (LMRA). In addition, Allied sought injunctive and
monetary relief under the Sherman Act because the union alleg-
edly engaged in an unlawful restraint of trade.
The federal district court denied Allied's request for a prelimi-
nary injunction, and granted the union's motion to dismiss. On ap-
peal, the First Circuit held that the complaint alleged a violation
of section 8(b)(4), vacated the dismissal of that portion of the com-
plaint, and remanded for further consideration of Allied's prayer
for damages and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
Regarding Allied's antitrust allegations, the First Circuit held
that the complaint failed to establish that the boycott amounted to
a violation of the antitrust law. The circuit court stated that it had
considered: "[W]hether or not the. . . boycott amounts to a viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. As such a violation would
entitle Allied to treble damages, this issue is not mooted by our
holding that a cause of action exists under the NLRA." 60
The First Circuit found that the union's political dispute with
Russia did not relate to a legitimate union interest, and thus, that
the boycott was not immunized by the statutory labor exemption.61
However, the First Circuit then concluded that the boycott did not
violate the antitrust laws since:
[T]his limited refusal to handle goods, undertaken as a political protest by a
labor union acting on its own, and ill-designed as a means of gaining a com-
petitive or commercial advantage for the union or its members, is not the
sort of evil at which the Sherman Act is aimed.
6
2
In the First Circuit's view, a union's mere refusal to work rarely
would violate the antitrust laws "absent a specific anticompetitive
object or collaboration with non-labor groups . .. "6" However,
the First Circuit made a comment that bears close attention:
This conclusion is fortified, though not compelled, by our finding, supra,
that the facts alleged make out a violation of LMRA § 303(a), 29 U.S.C. §
187(a). While the prohibitions of labor law and antitrust law overlap to
some degree, it has been said that, in general, § 303 was enacted as an alter-
native to subjecting unions to antitrust liability for secondary activities'
60. Id. at 1379.
61. Id. at 1380.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1381.
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amounting to a violation of section 8(b)(4) of the Act."'
The antitrust issue in Allied was not presented to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the First Circuit's holding on the scope of
section 8(b)(4)." Recently in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc., v.
International Longshoremen's Association," the Supreme Court
held that a similar union boycott was a "labor dispute" under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and, therefore, could not be enjoined. Al-
lied's antitrust implications are unclear since the issue was not
presented to, and thus not addressed by, the Supreme Court.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Jacksonville Bulk Termi-
nals, however, the union is protected from injunctions sought
under the antitrust laws and, most likely, would be immunized
against treble money damages as well.
Nearly a decade has passed since the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Connell. Subsequent cases have gradually de-
fined, to some degree, the contours of that decision. Regretfully,
however, these decisions have not fully clarified many of the ambi-
guities and difficult questions left in Connell's wake. If nothing
else, Connell has made it clear that the Supreme Court will not
countenance the use of anticompetitive, top-down organizational
tools by stranger unions which do not represent - nor wish to re-
present - the employees of companies from which restrictive
agreements are sought.
Connell had its day - indeed, a "good day" - in court. Actu-
ally, to say a "day" is a mischaracterization because the road that
ended with the Supreme Court's decision in Connell started much
earlier with the Dallas Building Trades case. There was a long and
arduous course which consumed years of litigation. Undoubtedly,
more chapters will be written. Today it is evident that the Su-
preme Court will not countenance picketing and boycotts by stran-
ger unions which do not seek bargaining relationships but which
have an object to force employers to sign restrictive agreements
which limit with whom they can do business.
Because Connell was ultimately settled, it is not known whether
the rule of reason or the per se rule would have been applied in
subsequent antitrust litigation. The union's aim in Connell was to
control the market place through the device of broad restrictive
subcontracting agreements - illegally obtained through severe ec-
64. Id.
65. 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982).
66. 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
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onomic sanctions - which were tied to a contractors association
contract which contained a most favored nation clause. The
union's aim was to keep from the market place all subcontractors
with whom it did not contract. This was, it is submitted, a classic
example of a classic boycott action which would have warranted
the imposition of the per se rule.

